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The study of attitudes toward distributive justice remains poorly developed in 
South Africa.  We know little about the ways in which old and new social 
cleavages are actually seen, and hence how they might be transformed into 
political cleavages.  Some preliminary, essentially qualitative data has suggested 
that there are a number of issues on which the employed and the unemployed hold 
contrasting attitudes, and that there is a growing perception on the part of the 
unemployed that they have distinct interests to the employed.  The 1993 PSLSD 
survey suggests that attitudes are influenced by the labour market status of other 
household members as well as the respondent's own status. Evidence from the 
2000 survey of Khayelitsha and Mitchell's Plain (Cape Town) reveals a picture of 
concern over inequality, massive support for government spending to counter 
poverty and inequality, but reduced support when respondents are faced with the 
prospect of increased taxes.  We also found evidence of scepticism around unions 
and strike action, together with a confusing mix of pro- and anti-business 
sentiments.  But we did not find any clear evidence that labour market status – or 
the labour market status of other household members – influenced attitudes in a 
significant way.  Our data does not suggest that, in this particular area, there is 




Since 1993 researchers in South Africa have enjoyed an abundance of quantitative 
data on the extent and patterns of inequality in South Africa.1  Not only has the 
design of the population census been improved markedly, but there has been a 
proliferation of household surveys with large and countrywide samples.  We now 
know a lot about distribution in South Africa (see, inter alia, Bhorat et al., 2001; 
Leibbrandt and Woolard, 2001; May et al., 2000; Seekings, 2000).  But how do 
South Africans see, understand and respond to the unequal distribution that exists 
                                          
1 This is a minimally revised version of a paper presented at the 2nd FES/DPRU Conference 
on Labour Markets and Poverty, Johannesburg, October 2002.  I am grateful to Servaas van 







in their society?  What kinds of inequality are considered just?  What do they think 
the government should do about inequality?  Should public expenditure be 
increased if it entails higher taxes?  Do citizens have obligations to each other?  
There exists little research on these issues.  Given the presumed political 
implications of the country’s unequal distribution, it is curious that the study of 
distributive justice remains poorly developed. 
 
The study of popular attitudes toward distribution has always been dominated by 
specific concerns of national political importance.  Thus, amidst the revolutionary 
prospects of the mid-1980s, scholars began to examine the extent of socialist 
views on economic transformation (e.g. Orkin, 1986).  When democratic elections 
became imminent, scholars wondered whether the country’s new black citizens 
had expectations of economic change that could not be met.  Empirical research 
into these questions was pioneering in the broader study of popular political 
culture and opinion, and served to qualify or undermine many conventional 
wisdoms.  Thus Charney, using evidence from focus groups in rural and urban 
areas, demonstrated that ‘the public is considerably more aware of the limits facing 
the new government, more realistic in its expectations, and more patient and 
hopeful about the future than conventional wisdom holds’ (1995: 1).  Johnson and 
Schlemmer, using opinion poll data, found that a minority of new citizens had 
more militant views but the majority held surprisingly moderate views on many 
issues; Johnson and Schlemmer concluded that most of the ANC’s supporters 
could be described best as ‘social democrats’ (1996: 88-9; see also Nattrass and 
Seekings, 1998). 
 
These studies initiated the analysis of perceived distributive justice in South 
Africa, but they did not produce any comprehensive overview of South Africans’ 
views.  This was not simply due to a lack of evidence.  It is likely that the surveys 
used by, for example, Johnson and Schlemmer might yield much wider-ranging 
analysis than these two scholars attempted.  The larger political parties certainly 
collected considerable data on public opinion, including data on distributive 
justice, for their own strategic planning during the 1994 election campaign (and 
surely thereafter also); much, perhaps most, of the data collected was never 
analysed.  The Human Sciences Research Council conducted a series of surveys 
between 1994 and 2000, but the research output has been rather underwhelming 
(see Rule, 2000; Klandermans et al., 2001).  Most curiously of all, perhaps, most 
of the data on distributive justice from the four South African ‘waves’ of the cross-






                                          
analysed.2  It is true that South Africa did not participate in either the 
International Social Justice Project3 or surveys conducted as part of the 
International Social Survey Program (which included a module on Social 
Inequality)4, but a lot of data is sitting in un- or under-used data-sets. 
 
In post-apartheid South Africa the political implications of inequality continue to 
depend on the ways in which social and political cleavages are formed and 
reformed.  The central question in the study of attitudes toward distributive justice 
now is surely not the extent of socialist values or the extravagance of popular 
expectations, but rather the ways in which intra- and inter-racial cleavages 
combine and conflict.  In previous work we have argued that under apartheid class 
replaced race as the foundation of inequality in South Africa (Nattrass and 
Seekings, 2001; Seekings and Nattrass, forthcoming; see also Crankshaw, 1997).  
The widening of intra-racial inequality is linked to the deepening of new intra-
racial social cleavages, perhaps the most important of which is the divide between 
employed ‘insiders’ and unemployed ‘outsiders’ in the ‘new’ South Africa.   
 
The emergence of a new social cleavage between employed insiders and 
unemployed or otherwise marginal outsiders has been examined in some detail in 
the context of contemporary Europe (see Matheson and Wearing, 1999).  But 
South Africa and Europe are very different places, of course.  Whilst much of 
Europe is post-industrial, South Africa can be described better as post-agrarian.  
Peasant society has disappeared, but not because everyone has been absorbed into 
industrial employment.  The result is the country’s exceptionally high rate of 
unemployment, whether measured in the Eurocentric ‘narrow’ or more appropriate 
‘broad’ terms.   
 
Is there evidence of the emergence of new patterns of intra-racial class 
consciousness in post-apartheid South Africa?  It is of course quite possible that 
2 The number of countries participating in the WVS has risen to 65 by 2001.  Although South 
Africa participated from the outset, the sample was not fully representative until the fourth 
wave in 2001; the samples in the first three waves omitted sections of the black population.  
See further Kotzé (2001) on the South African WVS and the extant analyses of the data. 
3 The ISJP was conceived in 1986 for the comparison of perceived social justice in capitalist 
and communist societies.  The first wave of surveys was conducted in 1991, in five capitalist 
and seven post-communist states.  See Kluegel, Mason and Wegener (1995). 
4 The ISSP was inaugurated in the mid-1980s, with annual surveys on a variety of topics in, 
by now, thirty-three, mostly industrialised countries.  Besides Europe, North America and 
Australasia, the ISSP covers the Philippines, China, Costa Rica and Chile.  The surveys 
included short modules on inequality beliefs in 1987, 1992 and 1999, and modules on the role 






new processes of stratification are happening in some objective sense, but are not 
reshaping the consciousness of the people involved.  South Africa might not 
comprise two racially-bound ‘nations’ according to economic criteria, but might 
be in a cultural sense.   
 
Some time ago two researchers found some evidence on the emergence of 
attitudinal cleavages rooted in labour market status. Møller (1992) and Charney 
(1995) suggested that unemployed people see themselves as having distinct 
interests and concerns to the employed.  Møller’s study was based on a 
combination of qualitative interviews and a quantitative survey in 1987-89 of 
1300 unemployed African people in Soweto, Mdantsane (East London) and the 
Greater Durban area.  She showed that the unemployed see themselves as 
different to employed workers.  The unemployed not only had a far lower 
perceived quality of life than township dwellers as a whole, but also experienced 
higher levels of anxiety, fear and depression than did working people.  Møller 
reports that 55 percent of her unemployed respondents said employed people did 
not really care about their welfare, and she found overwhelming agreement with 
the statement that ‘people who lose their jobs, lose their friends’. 
 
Both Møller and Charney found that unemployed people were critical of trade 
unions’ roles in inhibiting job creation.  As one person told Møller: ‘Employed 
people are striking for better wages; their protest blocks the chances for the 
unemployed’ (1992: 137). Charney also found that many people in his focus 
groups in late 1994 were critical of strikes because they were seen as 
discouraging investors and jeopardising growth (Charney, 1995: 29).  The 
attitudes of many working and most unemployed people were found to differ 
with regard to the priority attached to job creation.  Each of the focus groups in 
Charney’s study was asked the following: ‘Some people say, “Workers should 
get the highest possible wages they can, based on their skills and experience.”  
Others say, “Workers should be willing to accept lower increases so that more 
people can get work.”  What do you think?’.  Almost all of the groups favoured 
the second option – with the dissenters coming from precisely those groups that 
stand to gain the most from a high-wage, low-employment scenario (‘trade 
unionists and some formal township dwellers, particularly better-educated 
youth’.  These different perspectives on the justice of rewards reflect the 
position of most of the urban, industrial working class above the median but 








                                          
The work of labour economists suggests that not all unemployed are in the same 
class position, i.e. they are not all in equally ‘outside’ positions.  Some 
unemployed people enjoy relatively good access to opportunities to find 
employment, primarily through the networks of friends and family.  Other 
unemployed people lack the social capital needed to secure employment, and 
face the probability of extended unemployment.  These later constitute an 
‘underclass’ in the sense that they are especially disadvantaged, not only 
unemployed but facing especially poor employment prospects (Seekings, 2001).5 
 
There is some weak evidence that this kind of difference among the unemployed 
is reflected in their attitudes. The 1993 PSLSD data-set (collected by SALDRU 
at UCT and the World Bank) allows us to analyse aspects of attitude formation 
that are beyond most opinion polls because, unlike most polls, the PSLSD 
survey collected data on the household and other household members besides 
the respondent.  It also collected more detailed occupational data than is 
common in opinion polls.  This permits an analysis of the effects on some 
attitudes of the labour market status of other members of their household, and of 
the class position of the household as a whole (where class is defined on the 
basis of occupations of all household members, ownership of income-generating 
assets and entrepreneurial activity).  Unfortunately the survey asked very few 
attitudinal questions.  One question asked was: ‘What in your opinion could 
government do to most help this household improve its living conditions?  In 
other words, what do you need most?’ [sic].  Respondents were asked to name 
three things, and then rank them in order of importance.  One category of 
answers was “jobs’, which is somewhat ambiguous as it could mean either more 
or better jobs.  
 
5 Another approach to conceptualising the class position of the unemployed might be to 
examine their ‘employability’ (as Bhorat has done).  The unemployable might be considered a 
different class to the employable.  This approach would focus more on human capital, whilst 
mine focuses more on social capital.  The relative importance of these two is an empirical, not 






Table 1: Percentage of respondents saying that “jobs” were the most 
important problem, by household class and labour market status 
 




















Upper class  11   23 14 
Semi-professional 
class 
 25   32 30 
Intermediate class 49 22 43  30 29 
Core working class 56 32   31 35 
Marginal working 
class 
57 24 34  22 29 
Underclass 52    33 43 
Residual (Non 
labour force) class 
    17 19 
Total 53 23 38 32 24 29 
Source: PSLSD, 1993.  Note: cells omitted if insufficient n.  Classes are defined in terms 
of occupation of household members; households in the underclass have unemployed but 
no working members; households in the ‘non labour force class’ have neither 
unemployed nor working members.  Households classified in terms of self-employed 
members (excepting professionals) are excluded from all but the total row above.  For 
further detail, see Seekings (2000) and Seekings and Nattrass (forthcoming). 
 
 
Table 1 shows how respondents’ answers were influenced by both household 
class and their own labour market status.  As we can see in the final column of 
Table 1, the percentage of respondents who prioritised “jobs” varied by class: 
from less than 20 percent for the highest classes, to 43 percent for the 
underclass.  If we look at the other columns, we can see that labour market 
status counts also.  Jobs were prioritised by over half (53 percent) of the 
unemployed respondents and 38 percent of respondents in casual employment, 
compared to just 23 percent of respondents in regular employment and 24 
percent of respondents who were not participants in the labour force.  Even 
within classes we can see that labour market status matters.  In every class for 
which we have sufficient sub-samples, the proportion of unemployed 
respondents who prioritised jobs was much higher than the proportion of 
respondents in regular employment.  Thus unemployed individuals in core 
working class households were almost twice as likely to say that jobs were the 







A similar pattern is evident with respect to levels of satisfaction (see Table 2).  
Respondents were asked: ‘Taking everything into account, how satisfied is the 
household with the way it lives these days?’  Respondents were asked to circle 
one of five possible responses on a standard five-point Likert scale, extending 
from ‘very satisfied’ to ‘very unsatisfied’.   The final column indicates clear 
differences in satisfaction by class.  The preceding columns show clear 
differences within classes according to the labour market status of the 
respondent.  Thus the proportion of respondents in the upper class who said they 
were satisfied or very satisfied was above 60 percent.  In the intermediate and 
core working classes, the proportion was about 40 percent when the respondents 




Table 2: Percentage of respondents saying that they were “satisfied” or 
“very satisfied” with life, by household class and labour market status 
 


















Upper class  71   61 66 
Semi-professional 
class 
 42   43 40 
Intermediate class 20 45 23  37 38 
Core working class 15 37   24 29 
Marginal working 
class 
13 29 19  25 25 
Underclass 17    16 16 
Residual NLF class     23 23 
Total 19 45 26 35 30 34 
  
 
The next two tables show that the labour market status of other household 
members also makes a difference to the answers given by respondents.  Tables 3 
and 4 disaggregate the six shaded cells in Tables 1 and 2, separating respondents 
living in the same household as unemployed people from respondents living in 
households where no one is unemployed.  The cells are those for respondents in 
regular employment and not in the labour force, in the intermediate, core 
working and marginal working classes.  Table 3 shows that respondents are 






of their household were unemployed.  Table 4 shows that in general declared 
satisfaction is lower if other members of the household are unemployed.  
 
 
Table 3: Percentage of respondents saying that “jobs” were the most 
important problem, by household class, own labour market status and 
presence of unemployed people in household 
 






Not in labour 
force 
Yes 26 34 Intermediate 
class No 22 29 
Yes 37 39 Core working 
Class No 31 28 
Yes 28 29 Marginal 
working class No 23 19 
 
 
Table 4: Percentage of respondents saying that they were satisfied or 
very satisfied with life, by household class, own labour market status and 
presence of unemployed people in household 
 






Not in labour 
force 
Yes 28 29 Intermediate 
class No 47 39 
Yes 28 16 Core working 
Class No 38 27 
Yes 22 29 Marginal 
working class No 30 24 
 
 
These findings require us to be cautious in interpreting opinion polls that do not 
collect any information about other members of the household besides the 
respondent.  It seems likely that the priorities of respondents who have jobs are 
likely to vary according to whether or not there are other members of their 






are at risk of painting a somewhat misleading picture of the effects of labour 
market status on attitudes. 
 
The rest of this paper explores the relationship between labour market status and 
some attitudes to distributive justice using data from an experimental module of 
questions on distributive justice included in a survey undertaken in one magisterial 
district in Cape Town at the end of 2000.  This survey covered a mix of urban 
poor, working-class and middle-class African and coloured people.  Compared to 
the population of South Africa as a whole, most of our respondents were in the top 
three if not the top two income quintiles.  This is certainly not the ideal sample to 
use to assess attitudinal differences.  But, as we shall see, unemployment rates 
were very high.  If unemployment correlated with different views on distributive 
justice issues within this sample, then we could be confident that the social 
cleavage of unemployment is generally consequential in terms of attitudes.  
 
What we found was a curious mix of attitudes.  On a number of issues we found 
divergent responses.  But the differences rarely correlated with labour market 
status.  Indeed, in some instances there was actually the inverse of the relationship 
that we had expected.  Taking into account a wide range of indirect labour market 
and other factors fails to explain most of the variation in attitudes.  Our findings 
are, to put it bluntly, inconclusive: we find weakly significant relationships 
between various independent variables and some of the attitudes recorded in our 
survey, but even taking into account a wide range of prospective independent 
variables fails to explain most of the variation in popular attitudes.  This is not a 
unique South African situation.  The study of popular attitudes over distributive 
justice in other parts of the world has shown that ‘country’ is the most significant 
factor explaining attitudes in international studies; intra-national factors (class, 
education, age and so on) are rarely anywhere near as significant, even in 
explaining variation within national samples (see Svallfors, 1997; Matheson and 
Wearing, 1999).   
 
 
The 2000 Khayelitsha/Mitchell’s Plain Survey 
 
The magisterial district of Mitchell’s Plain covers the bulk of the Cape Flats to the 
east of central Cape Town.  It includes the city’s African townships of Langa, 
Nyanga, Guguletu and Khayelitsha, as well as numerous informal settlements.  It 
also includes extensive areas that under apartheid were classified as ‘coloured’, but 
no formerly ‘white’ group areas.  In total, according to the 1996 Population 






total population.  In racial terms, the population of the district is approximately 
two-thirds African and one-third coloured.  In terms of income, the population 
extends from the poor to the moderately rich, although most households probably 
fall into the third and fourth income quintiles for the country as a whole. 
 
In November/December 2000 we conducted a survey focused on labour market 
issues.  The sample encompassed just over one thousand households, spread 
across the district.  We tried to interview every adult member of these 
households, but only succeeded in collecting data on about 86 percent of the 
identified adult household members (this includes a number of adults 
interviewed by proxy, i.e. where information was provided by another member 
of the household).  This gave us a total of 2644 adult respondents.  We failed to 
collect usable data on labour market status on 146 of these, giving us a usable 
sample of about 2500 adults. 
 
 
Table 5: Labour Market Status among Adults in KMP, 2000 
 
Labour market category Number Percentage 
Employed 1158 46 
   regular wage employed 882 35 
   self-employed 210 8 
   casual employed 66 3 
Unemployed 1011 40 
   Active job-seekers 448 18 
   Exclusive network job-seekers 173 7 
   Marginalised unemployed 390 16 
Non Labour Force Participants 329 13 
Total 2498 100 
  
 
We are yet to conduct a full analysis of the ‘missing’ adults in the survey, but it 
is clear that they are disproportionately men and are likely to be 
disproportionately in employment of one kind or another.  If, as is likely, the 
missing adults are not occur at random in the sample, then we cannot conclude 
that the unemployment rate is almost 50 percent – as might be implied by Table 
5.  What Table 5 does tell us is that we have significant numbers of adults in 
each of the seven labour market status categories listed. The categories in the 
Table are as defined by Nattrass (2002).  The employed are divided into regular 
wage employed, the self-employed and casual employed.  Unemployed are 
divided into active job-seekers, network job-seekers (who rely on friends and 






do not look for work in any way, although they say they want work. Table 6 





Table 6: Labour Market Status by Gender, Race and Age (%) 
 

































Employed 55 39 52 44 23 46 61 59 50 23 
   regular 
   employed 
46 27 45 31 17 37 46 46 37 13 
   self-employed 5 11 5 10 3 7 11 11 9 9 
   casual employed 4 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 1 
Unemployed 34 45 27 46 64 50 34 30 25 18 
   active job- 
   seekers 
20 17 10 21 29 25 13 14 10 6 
   network job- 
   seekers 
5 8 6 7 11 7 8 5 4 1 
   marginalised 
   unemployed 
9 20 11 18 24 18 13 11 12 11 
Non Labour 
Force Participants 
10 15 21 10 13 4 5 12 25 59 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 




Attitudes in Khayelitsha/Mitchell’s Plain 
 
The module (‘M’) on distributive justice comprised thirty-six agree/disagree 
questions (the last of which was not on distribution but rather concerned 
HIV/AIDs).  Many of these questions were taken from or derived from questions 
used in the ISJP or ISSP.  In addition, we asked all respondents twelve 
agree/disagree questions on unemployment (F3.1-12), and respondents who were 
unemployed or did not participate in the labour force were asked another nine 
agree/disagree questions (F32, 1-9).6  Thus respondents should have been asked a 
total of between thirty-five and fifty-six questions with some bearing on 
distributive issues and the consequences of distribution. 
                                          







Our goal was in large part experimental, in that we wanted to examine what kinds 
of questions seem to ‘work’ in the South African context.  As ever, we were 
constrained in the number of questions we could ask, and had to omit many 
questions that we would have liked to ask.  
 
We asked three questions concerning general aspects of life in South Africa.  
Slightly more agreed than disagreed that ‘people today are better off than their 
parents 25 years ago’ (M4, 53 percent agreeing or agreeing strongly, compared to 
36 percent disagreeing or disagreeing strongly), with almost no difference between 
coloured and African respondents.  Views on whether ‘overall, the this country is 
moving in the right direction’ (M15) and whether ‘the government is doing a good 
job’ (M17) were more racially divided.  On both questions, African respondents 
were more positive (about 50 percent agree versus about 32 percent disagree) and 















M1: If you work hard today 
you can get rich in SA today 
15 19 11 33 22 3.28 1.38 
M2: It is easy for children from 
poor families to get a good 
education 
29 29 9 22 11 2.57 1.39 
M3: If you get a good 
education, it is easy to become 
rich in SA today 
8 17 14 38 23 3.52 1.23 
M9: Many poor people are poor 
because they are lazy 
44 22 13 13 7 2.17 1.31 
M21: Many people in this 
country receive less income 
than they deserve 
2 4 11 41 41 4.16 0.92 
M32: Inequality continues 
because it benefits the rich and 
powerful 
3 5 16 43 33 2.98 0.98 
 
 
Our first major bundle of questions concerning social justice concerned how 
people become rich, i.e. the perceived causes of poverty and inequality (see 
Table 7: In this and the following tables, the mean is calculated through coding 






as a route to affluence (M3), but fewer respondents said that it is easy for children 
from poor families to get a good education (M2).  Respondents were divided over 
whether affluence could be achieved through hard work (M1), but very few agreed 
that poor people were poor because they were lazy (M9).  There was very strong 
agreement that many people receive less income than they deserve (M21) and 
most people agreed that inequality continues because it favours the rich and 
powerful (M32).  We also asked a batch of questions about unemployment (F3).  
These clearly indicated that, in the view of our respondents, some people had 
much better chances of finding a job than others.  In sum, our respondents tended 
to view South Africa as a society with unequal opportunities, although hard work 
might provide a route to prosperity. 
 
 











M7: The value of the state old 
age pension should be 
increased  
1 2 6 31 60 4.46 0.81 
M13: The government should 
provide everyone with a 
guaranteed basic income (like it 
does for old people through the 
old-age grant) 
6 9 10 38 37 3.91 1.17 
M16: The government should 
provide free health care 
3 4 4 32 57 4.35 0.96 
M27: The government should 
spend more on education and 
health 
1 3 5 34 57 4.43 0.79 
M18: The government should 
help the unemployed 
1 2 4 37 56 4.47 0.72 
M5: The government should 
ensure that all schools are 
equally good 
1 2 4 38 56 4.47 0.71 
M6: The government should 
provide better education for 
children from poor families to 
ensure that they have the same 
opportunities as children from 
richer families 
0 1 3 32 64 4.57 0.66 
M12: The government should 
reduce the differences in 
income between rich and poor 
people 








A second bundle of questions interrogated attitudes toward government policies, 
especially government spending (see Table 8).  Five questions elicited almost 
identically patterned responses, with between 75 percent and 94 percent of 
respondents agreeing (including agreeing strongly) to statements implying that 
the government should spend more on old-age pensions (M7), a basic income 
grant (M13), health care (M16), and education and health (M27).  A similar 
proportion agreed that the government should help the unemployed (M18), 
although the statement did not refer at all to expenditure; elsewhere in the 
questionnaire we asked specifically how much respondents agreed that ‘the 
government should provide jobs for everyone who wants one’ (F3.11), and got 
almost identical results.  Our respondents massively favoured government action 
and expenditure in a range of areas. 
   
Three questions examined the perceived role of government with respect to 
inequality in particular (see Table 8).  Our respondents agreed overwhelmingly 
that the government should ensure that all schools are equally good (M5) and 
‘should provide better education for children from poor families to ensure that they 
have the same opportunities as children from richer families’ (M6).  We found 
only slightly lower agreement with the statement that ‘the government should 
reduce the difference in income between rich and poor people’ (M12).  These 
responses indicate strongly egalitarian preferences. 
 
























M8: The government old-age 
pension should be increased 
even if it means that people like 
you have to pay higher taxes 
11 18 15 28 27 3.42 1.36 
M10: Poor people pay too 
much tax 
12 15 27 29 16 3.23 1.23 
M11: Taxation should be 
increased so that more money 
is available for the government 
to spend. 
26 25 19 20 10 2.63 1.33 
M14: People like you pay too 
much tax. 
10 15 26 29 20 3.34 1.24 
 
 
Questions about government policies often focus on the benefits rather than the 
costs.  We asked a set of questions probing perceived willingness to pay taxes (see 






means that people like you have to pay higher taxes’, the proportion of 
respondents who agreed strongly fell by half from 60 percent (M7) to 27 percent 
(M8), and the proportion who disagreed or disagreed strongly rose tenfold, from 3 
to 29 percent!  Almost half of our sample agreed that ‘poor people pay too much 
tax’ (M10) and over half were opposed to increasing taxes ‘so that more money is 
available for the government to spend’ (M11).   Half the sample thought that 
people like themselves paid too much tax (M14).  Enthusiasm for government 
spending is clearly greatly reduced when there is the prospect of paying higher 
taxes. 
 
Given our concern with the labour market, we asked a set of questions probing 
respondents’ attitudes toward unemployment, employment and trade unions.  We 
have already seen that there is little support for the proposition that poor people are 
poor because they are lazy (M9, see Table 8 above) and overwhelming agreement 
that ‘the government should help the unemployed’ (M18, see Table 8 above).  Are 
trade unions seen to ‘look after the interests of the unemployed’ (M19)?  On this 
we found a spread of responses, from 19 percent disagreeing strongly to 13 percent 
agreeing strongly (see Table 10).  We found a similarly wide spread of responses 
to the statement ‘workers go on strike too often’ (M28) and a high level of 
agreement that ‘it is bad for the economy for workers to go on strike’ (M30).  At 
the same time, most respondents agreed with the statement that ‘workers cannot 
get a fair wage unless they go on strike sometimes’ (M29).  It seems that there is at 
least some scepticism around unions and strike action. 
 
 
























M19: Trade unions look after 
the interests of the unemployed 
19 21 24 22 13 2.88 1.31 
M20: Employers should be 
allowed to hire temporary 
workers when their workforce 
is on strike 
33 22 13 21 11 2.56 1.41 
M28: Workers go on strike too 
often 
12 24 21 27 16 3.12 1.27 
M29: Workers cannot get a fair 
wage unless they go on strike 
sometimes 
3 9 17 43 27 3.82 1.04 
M30: It is bad for the economy 
for workers to go on strike 








Finally, we examined attitudes towards government, business and investment (see 
Table 11).  We found strong agreement that South Africa needs investment and 
that allowing business to make profits is the best way to encourage investment 
(M34, M35).  But responses to our other questions paint a confusing picture.  
Respondents agreed that financial incentives are important (M31) but were divided 
over the importance of inequality for prosperity (M33).  Respondents also said that 
large companies had too much power (M22), and expressed support for the 
government playing a bigger role in running large companies (M26).  Opinions 
were divided over whether ordinary workers could manage companies effectively 




























M22: Large companies have 
too much power in SA today 
2 5 27 39 27 3.84 0.95 
M23: Ordinary workers could 
manage companies effectively 
without bosses 
16 24 22 25 13 2.95 1.28 
M26: The government should 
play a bigger role in running 
large companies 
3 6 22 39 30 3.88 0.99 
M31: People will not take on 
extra responsibilities at work 
unless they are paid to do it 
3 7 15 46 29 3.91 1.00 
M33: Large differences in 
income are necessary for SA’s 
prosperity 
22 20 22 24 12 2.83 1.33 
M34: The country needs more 
investment if the economy is to 
grow with a rising standard of 
living 
2 3 17 46 32 4.04 0.87 
M35: Allowing business to 
make profits is the best way to 
encourage investment 
2 5 23 43 27 3.87 0.94 
 
 
Because some of the KMP questions were taken from international studies – the 
ISJP and ISSP – the responses in Khayelitsha and Mitchell’s Plain can be 
compared with those from other countries.  Cross-national comparisons are 






sample was, of course, not a national one.7  But the magnitude of differences 
between responses in different countries is striking. 
 
 
Table 12: Some Cross-National Comparisons: Percentage agreeing or 
agreeing strongly with statements 
 













provide a basic 
income 
(KMP M13) 
KMP, South Africa 77 36 88 77 
Australia 52 64 49 61 
West Germany 76 73 78 57 
Norway 72 79 90 86 
USA 49 65 54 39 
 Source: ISSP data, presented in Matheson and Wearing (1999) 
 
 
Table 12 shows that our respondents in Cape Town were in general as egalitarian 
as Norwegians (although they did not share the latter’s view that inequality was 
necessary for national prosperity), and were considerably more egalitarian than 
Australians and Americans.   
 
 
Explaining Variations in Attitudes 
 
The tables above indicate quite high variance (excepting Table 8).  Do differences 
in attitudes reflect positions in the labour market?  Do the unemployed appear to 
have different attitudes to the employed?  Are there differences of opinion among 
the unemployed or the employed, and what explains any such differences?   
 
In South Africa we might plausibly expect that any of the following factors shape 
distributive justice attitudes, especially on issues relevant to employment and 
unemployment: 
• the current labour market status of the respondent 
• the labour market status of other household members 
• qualifications and past work experience 
• the employment/unemployment history of the respondent 
                                          
7 There are, of course, many other difficulties in cross-national comparisons, even when using semi-standardised 
data such as the ISSP or ISJP surveys.  Response rates differ, and the patterns of non-responses are rarely 






• the employment/unemployment histories of other household members 
• individual earnings 




First, we examine these factors with respect to selected questions from our survey: 
• M1: If you work hard you can get rich in SA today. 
• M4: People today are better off than their parents were twenty-five years ago. 
• M8: The government old age pension should be increased even if it means that 
people like you pay higher taxes. 
• M19: Trade unions look after the interests of the unemployed. 
• M33: Large differences in income are necessary for SA’s prosperity. 
These are all questions to which there was a wide dispersion of responses – in 
contrast to questions such as the ones on government spending, where there was 
near unanimity that the government should spend more (see Table 8). 
 
 
The Effects of Labour Market Status  
 
Table 13 sets out the means and standard deviations for responses to these five 
statements, broken down by labour market status.  (Whilst the precise definition of 
labour market categories is inevitably somewhat arbitrary, using alternative 
categories does not appear to make any difference to the general results).  There is 
little obvious rhyme or reason in the results.  Self-employed respondents record 
a higher mean for M1, which is perhaps unsurprising – but so too do network 
job-seekers, and in fact all unemployed categories score higher means than 
regular or casual wage employees.  The lack of variation between categories is 
most striking for M19 and M33.  In contrast, almost every cell has a high 








Table 13: Selected Attitudes, by Labour Market Status 
 
 If work hard, 







even if more 








Labour market category     Mn SD Mn SD Mn SD Mn SD Mn SD
Employed 3.17 1.38 3.17 1.40 3.39 1.38 2.82 1.32 2.79 1.34 
   regular wage emp. 3.09 1.37 3.21 1.38 3.39 1.36 2.82 1.31 2.80 1.36 
   self-employed 3.45 1.40 3.02 1.48 3.37 1.40 2.73 1.35 2.78 1.27 
   casual employed 3.21 1.38 3.25 1.39 3.45 1.51 3.03 1.33 2.79 1.27 
Unemployed 3.37 1.39 3.20 1.46 3.37 1.36 2.86 1.32 2.82 1.33 
   Active job-seekers 3.41 1.40 3.18 1.40 3.36 1.37 2.85 1.33 2.81 1.27 
   Network job-seekers 3.36 1.41 3.36 1.46 3.42 1.40 3.04 1.34 2.82 1.44 
   Marginalised unemp. 3.29 1.37 3.15 1.44 3.37 1.35 2.79 1.30 2.91 1.23 
Non LF Participants 3.35 1.35 3.26 1.43 3.67 1.26 3.16 1.23 2.95 1.31 
Total 3.28 1.38 3.20 1.41 3.42 1.36 2.88 1.31 2.82 1.33 
 
 
Earlier in the paper we saw that the labour market status of other household 
members appeared to influence some attitudes, according to the 1993 PSLSD data.  
Is there evidence of similar effects in the KMP data?  Table 14 indicates the 
distribution of respondents by labour market status and the labour market status of 
other household members.8  It shows that at least half of our sample lived in 
households where someone else was working, and a similar proportion lived in 
households where at least one other adult was unemployed.  We therefore end up 
with a good mix of households in terms of possible combinations of the labour 
market status of our respondent and other household members: employed 
respondents in households without unemployed members; employed respondents 
in households with unemployed members; unemployed respondents in households 
with employed members; and unemployed respondents in households without any 
employed members (as well as equivalent combinations for non-participants in the 
labour force).  This should enable us to test whether the patterns found in the 1993 
national PSLSD data are reflected also in the 2000 KMP data from Cape Town. 
 
                                          
8 I must point out a serious flaw in the data reported in these tables.  I have been unable to 
separate out those households which have missing adults, i.e. where we failed to collect full 
data on one or mor adult household members.  Because of this there will be a number of 
individuals who have been mistakenly included in the “no” column rather than the “yes” column 
in Table 14, as the missing adults might be either unemployed or working,  The percentages for 
“yes” are almost certainly underestimated.  This does not affect our analysis of attitudes, 
however, because we are omitting individuals in households with missing adults unless a non-








Table 14: Labour Market Status of Adults and Other Household 
Members 
 
 Are any other household 
members unemployed? 
Are any other household 
members in regular 
wage employment? 








Employed 51 49   
   regular wage employed 52 48   
   self-employed 46 54   
   casual employed 62 38   
Unemployed   48 52 
   Active job-seekers   46 54 
   Exclusive network job-seekers   50 50 
   Marginalised unemployed   49 51 
Non Labour Force Participants 47 53 50 50 
Total     
 
 
Table 15: Selected Attitudes, by Labour Market Status of Respondents 
and of Other Household Members 
 
 If work hard, 
then get rich 
(M1) 
Workers go 





even if more 








Labour market category     Mn SD Mn SD Mn SD Mn SD Mn SD
Respondent in regular wage 
employment, in household 
without any unemployed 
members 
3.06 1.37 3.20 1.31 3.55 1.32 2.82 1.32 2.75 1.37 
Respondent in regular wage 
employment, in household 
with one or more unemployed 
members 
3.13 1.36 3.05 1.24 3.23 1.38 2.83 1.29 2.84 1.36 
Unemployed respondent, in 
household with another 
member in employment 
3.31 1.39 3.03 1.25 3.30 1.35 2.80 1.28 2.82 1.34 
Unemployed respondent, in 
household without any member 
in employment 
3.46 1.39 3.12 1.33 3.48 1.38 2.95 1.37 2.82 1.33 
Non labour force participants, 
in household with at least one 
working member 
3.21 1.38 3.35 1.26 3.57 1.25 3.11 1.19 2.97 1.34 
Non labour force participants 
in households with at least one 
unemployed member 







Table 15 reports some of the results if we cross-tabulate selected attitudes against 
the labour market status of our respondents and of other household members.  In 
some cases there appears to be a pattern.  Views on “if you work hard, you can get 
rich in South Africa today” (M1) appear to be related to our combined labour 
market categories: the ‘more’ unemployed the household, so as to speak, the 
stronger the agreement with this statement.  Unemployed people seem to think that 
there are more rewards for hard work than working people.  One possible 
explanation for this is that working people know that working hard does not result 
in ‘getting rich’, either because affluence is defined by a different criterion or 
because income is drained in supporting dependants, including unemployed 
dependants.  Responses to the questions on strikes (M28), tax (M), trade unions 
and the unemployed (M19) and the necessity of inequality (M33) do not show any 
obvious pattern.  Standard deviations are high in all categories.  A variety of 
statistical tests (t-tests, one-way ANOVA) suggest that there is no significant 
relationship between labour market status and these attitudes (except that non-
participation in the labour force does seem weakly significant in some cases). 
 
 
Analysing Indices of Attitudes 
 
To analyse further possible causes of attitudes we construct a series of indices.  
In each case the index sums the scores on the component questions; where the 
meaning of the question is reverse, then the inverse scores are used in the index. 
 
• Indexopportunities = M1+M2+M3+M9+inverseM21+inverseM32 
• Indextax = M8+M11+inverseM14 
• Indexunions = M19+inverseM28+M29+inverseM30 
 
High scores in “indexopportunities” indicate the belief that South Africa is a 
land of opportunity; high scores in “indextax” indicate approval of high taxes; 
high scores in “indexunions” indicate approval of unions and strike action.  The 
results for all three indices approximate normal distributions.  
 
There does not appear to be any significant relationship between labour market 
status and views on any of these three indices.  Indeed, it is hard to see any 
relationship between any of the obvious social, economic and demographic 
factors and these attitudes.  Table 16 shows the means scores for each index 








Table 16: Mean Scores on Indices 
 
 Indexunions Indextax Indexopportunities
Unemployed 12.0 8.7 15.1 
Employed 11.9 8.4 14.7 
Not participating in labour force 11.8 8.7 15.7 
African 12.1 8.7 14.5 
Coloured 11.5 8.3 16.0 
Men  11.9 8.4 15.0 
Women 11.9 8.7 15.0 
below mean earnings 12.0 8.7 15.1 
above mean earnings 11.9 8.4 14.8 
overall mean 11.9 8.6 15.0 
possible range of scores 4-20 3-15 6-30 
 
 
Regressions fail to indicate many significant relationships.  Appendix 1 reports 
the results of regressing each of these indices against age, individual earnings 
and education, as well as dummy variables for race, labour market status of both 
respondents and their families, and the prior history of unemployment of the 
respondent, fails to generate.  For “indexunions”, age and education are both 
significant, with inverse relationships to the index (i.e. older and/or more 
educated respondents were less approving of unions and strikes).  For 
“indextax”, being unemployed and having other employed members of the 
household were both mildly significant.  The regression for “indexopportunities” 
shows that race is significant.  In all three cases, r-squareds are low.  Even where 
there are ‘significant’ relationships, they are generally inconsequential.  It 
certainly is not the case that labour market status in Khayelitsha and Mitchell’s 





The primary purpose of this paper was to analyse whether there is any clear 
relationship between labour market status and attitudes, such that we might see 
the emergence of a socio-political cleavage.  Previous data – from the 1993 
PSLSD – suggested that there might be such a relationship, albeit a complex 
one, where attitudes reflect both the respondent’s labour market status, the class 
position of the respondent’s household, and the labour market status of other 
members of the household.  Our major finding from our examination of the 2000 






                                          
corresponding to labour market status.  Politicians might be able to mobilise 
around the issue of unemployment, but are unlikely to be able to do so 
successfully among the unemployed specifically.  There is little indication that 
unemployment is likely to emerge as a new political cleavage in metropolitan 
South Africa. 
 
This finding might reflect the character of the sample in the KMP survey.  First, 
the KMP survey was limited to one part of one metropolitan area (Cape Town).  
It is possible that the patterns visible in the national PSLSD data are not visible 
in this particular metropolitan area.  To test this, we went back and re-examined 
the PSLSD data.  In the country as a whole, 53 percent of respondents who were 
unemployed prioritised jobs, compared to 23 percent of respondents who were 
working and lived in households where no one was unemployed and 38 percent 
of respondents who were working but lived in households where someone was 
unemployed.  In Cape Town, the proportions were 65 percent, 27 percent and 41 
percent respectively.  The difference between responses of employed and 
unemployed were greater in metropolitan areas in general than in small towns or 
rural areas.   The pattern of different responses remains clear when class is taken 
into account.9  In sum, the apparent difference between PSLSD and KMP data is 
not due to the fact that the latter was limited to Cape Town.  The KMP survey 
did, however, exclude the very rich – with no white respondents, and few upper 
income coloured or African respondents.  This might make a small difference, 
rendering differences muted in KMP compared to even Cape Town as a whole.   
 
There might also be problems with the quality of the data.  Most of the attitudinal 
questions in KMP were asked at the end of the interviews.  Interviewer and 
respondent fatigue might affect the quality of the data.  Further analysis of 
responses by interviewer and location might help detect observable interviewer 
effects. 
 
This research does raise broader questions of significance.  In cross-national 
studies of social justice attitudes, regressions typically result in very low r-
9 There were too few respondents in Cape Town alone to analyse patterns by class, labour 
market status and the status of other household members, but this could be done for the 
metropolitan areas combined.  In the ‘intermediate class’ (across all metropolitan areas), jobs 
were prioritised by 48 percent of unemployed respondents, 24 percent of working respondents 
in households without unemployed members and 32 percent of working respondents in 
housheolds with unemployed members.  Core working class: 71 percent, 33 percent and 38 
percent respectively.  Marginal working class: 69 percent, 25 percent and 33 percent 






squareds.  For example, Svallfors runs regressions for national level data for 
Norway, Germany, Australia and the USA, regressing attitudes to redistribution 
against gender, class and labour market status.  He reports significant correlations 
for several class and labour market categories, but the r-squareds range from under 
4 percent (Australia) to 12 percent (Norway).  Other studies report even lower r-
squareds.  It appears that, even in cases where other tests show significant 
relationships, very little of the variance in attitudes in explained by the kinds of 
factors we are examining.  Further research is clearly required, both within South 









Appendix 1: Regression results 
 
 
(1) Index of opportunities 
 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1215 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 12,  1202) =    6.88 
       Model |  1068.14449    12  89.0120407           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  15549.5148  1202  12.9363684           R-squared     =  0.0643 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0549 
       Total |  16617.6593  1214  13.6883519           Root MSE      =  3.5967 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
indexoppor~s |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    a2dummy1 |   -1.84704   .3186377    -5.80   0.000    -2.472188   -1.221892 
    a2dummy2 |  (dropped) 
newvardummy1 |   .1275058   .3896911     0.33   0.744    -.6370446    .8920562 
newvardummy2 |  -.4593624   .4309089    -1.07   0.287     -1.30478    .3860547 
newvardummy3 |  (dropped) 
otherunemp~1 |   .0020324   .2115293     0.01   0.992    -.4129754    .4170401 
otherempin~1 |   .5009847   .2175694     2.30   0.021     .0741266    .9278427 
          a1 |  -.0010108   .0100873    -0.10   0.920    -.0208015    .0187798 
          a7 |  -.0293663   .0409821    -0.72   0.474    -.1097707     .051038 
bornCTdummy1 |   .0828206   .3143582     0.26   0.792    -.5339311    .6995724 
    d1dummy1 |  -.2823323   1.371688    -0.21   0.837      -2.9735    2.408836 
  d2_5dummy1 |   -.215519   .2292556    -0.94   0.347    -.6653047    .2342666 
q3adultdum~1 |   .1342382   .2194732     0.61   0.541    -.2963548    .5648313 
monthlytak~y |  -.0001038   .0001104    -0.94   0.347    -.0003203    .0001127 




(2) Index of attitudes to taxation 
 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1164 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 12,  1151) =    2.52 
       Model |  182.788602    12  15.2323835           Prob > F      =  0.0029 
    Residual |   6966.8016  1151  6.05282503           R-squared     =  0.0256 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0154 
       Total |  7149.59021  1163  6.14754102           Root MSE      =  2.4602 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    indextax |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    a2dummy1 |   .0762048   .2181795     0.35   0.727    -.3518693    .5042789 
    a2dummy2 |  (dropped) 
newvardummy1 |   .4366678    .207838     2.10   0.036     .0288839    .8444516 
newvardummy2 |  (dropped) 
newvardummy3 |   .2947247   .2991407     0.99   0.325    -.2921974    .8816468 
otherunemp~1 |   -.057415   .1491318    -0.38   0.700    -.3500157    .2351857 
otherempin~1 |   .3068136    .152275     2.01   0.044     .0080459    .6055813 
          a1 |  -.0024091   .0071496    -0.34   0.736    -.0164369    .0116187 
          a7 |  -.0262875   .0286267    -0.92   0.359     -.082454    .0298789 
bornCTdummy1 |  -.2421753    .214044    -1.13   0.258    -.6621354    .1777847 
    d1dummy1 |   1.827071   1.110212     1.65   0.100    -.3511962    4.005338 
  d2_5dummy1 |  -.2957508   .1619429    -1.83   0.068    -.6134871    .0219856 






monthlytak~y |  -.0000548   .0000739    -0.74   0.459    -.0001998    .0000902 




(3) Index of attitudes to trade unions, etc 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1235 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  9,  1225) =    2.59 
       Model |  143.288561     9  15.9209512           Prob > F      =  0.0058 
    Residual |  7525.78512  1225  6.14349806           R-squared     =  0.0187 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0115 
       Total |  7669.07368  1234   6.2148085           Root MSE      =  2.4786 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    indextax |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    a2dummy1 |   .2788664   .1584125     1.76   0.079    -.0319234    .5896563 
    a2dummy2 |  (dropped) 
newvardummy1 |   .4190601   .2014222     2.08   0.038     .0238894    .8142307 
newvardummy2 |  (dropped) 
newvardummy3 |   .4427115   .2848375     1.55   0.120    -.1161119    1.001535 
otherunemp~2 |   .1484709   .1456995     1.02   0.308    -.1373772     .434319 
otherunemp~1 |  (dropped) 
otherempin~1 |   .2659512   .1485497     1.79   0.074    -.0254888    .5573911 
          a1 |   .0001468   .0068222     0.02   0.983    -.0132377    .0135314 
          a7 |  -.0159356   .0279813    -0.57   0.569    -.0708322    .0389609 
q3adultdum~1 |   -.180259   .1508865    -1.19   0.232    -.4762835    .1157655 
monthlytak~y |  -4.05e-06   .0000708    -0.06   0.954     -.000143    .0001349 
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